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CASE SUMMARIES
CERCLA
United States v. USX Corporation, 68

F.3d 811 (3rd Cir. .1995)
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA), the United States
filed suit against USX Corporation (USX),
Atlantic Disposal Service (ADS), the principal shareholders of ADS, Alvin White
(White) and Charles Carite (Carite), and
three additional White-Carite companies
for cleanup costs associated with a hazardous waste disposal site. USX filed
cross-claims against all other defendants
for contribution, as permitted by
CERCLA.
ADS transported drums of hazardous
waste to disposal sites for USX. Testing
at one of these disposal sites revealed a
release of hazardous substances into the
environment, resulting in groundwater
contamination. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) alleged liability
against USX as a generator of hazardous waste under CERCLA § 107(a)(3).
USX negotiated a settlement prior to trial
on the basis of EPA's proposals. EPA
further sought transporter liability against
ADS, and personal liability against
White and Carite as the sole officers
and directors of ADS under CERCIA §
107(a)(4). Finally, it also daimed transporter liability against the White-Carite
companies, arguing that the companies
were implicated as joint venture participants with defendant ADS. The district
court granted a motion for summary
judgment in favor of the government.
After reaching a settlement with USX,
the only claim the United States had remaining was for declaratory judgment of
liability for future costs against the remaining defendants. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
1.2ld summary judgment was inappropriate on the issue of personal liability in
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light of the evidence presented and remanded the case.
In challenging the summary judgment, White and Carite argued the district court erred in assessing liability on
the basis of their dayto-day involvement
in the business. They claimed the standard should be personal participation in
the decision or actual knowledge of the
selection of a disposal site and acquiescence in that decision.
The court of appeals examined case
low establishing an "actual control" test
for corporate officer liability as an operator of a hazardous waste facility under
CERCLA § 107(a)(1) and (a)(2). The
court then chose to adhere to CERCIA's
"traditional concepts of limited liability
under § 107(a)(4). These traditional
concepts mandate actual participation in
the wrongful conduct for the imposition
of personal liability on the shareholders.
The court found that White and Carite presented sufficient evidence regarding their noninvolvement with the
transportation of hazardous waste that a
reasonable jury could find in their favor
based on the court's standards for
shareholder-transporter liability. It remanded the case for determination of
White and Carite's personal liability under these guidelines.
- by Rebecca J. Grosser

Macklanburg-Duncon Company v.
Aetna Casually and Surely Company,
71 F.3d 1526 (10th Cir. 1995)
In 1986, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) brought a civil action
under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA) against Royal Hardage,
the owner and operator of a hazardous
waste disposal site. The EPA named
numerous other defendants, including

appellant Mocklanburg-Duncan Co., the
majority of which formed the Hordage
Steering Committee (HSC) and stipulated
to liability. The HSC then filed thirdparty complaints against those companies that had contributed hazardous
waste to the Hardage site. The HSC
sought reimbursement of the costs of its
liability in the CERCLA action. While the
third-party complaints were filed separately, the appeals in the instant action
were
joined
and
decided
simultaneously.
Downtown Airpark, Inc., and Double
Eagle Refining Company were both
third-party defendants. Downtown Airpark settled HSC's claim against it. The
district court entered summary judgment
for HSC against Double Eagle for the
remaining amount attributable to that
company.
HSC then filed for a declaratory
judgment, stating that the insurers of Double Eagle were liable to HSC for the proceeds of comprehensive general liability
(CGL) policies issued to Double Eagle.
HSC also initiated a garnishment proceeding against the insurers of Double
Eagle. HSC argued that, as a judgment
lien creditor of Double Eagle, it was entitIed to the proceeds of the CGL and also
was entitled to garnish the proceeds of
the CGL policies that were in the possession of the garnishee insurers. The insurers moved for summary judgment based
upon an exclusion in the CGL policies
that excluded coverage for personal injury or property damage caused by pollution discharge. The policy, however,
contained additional language that
would make the exclusion ineffective if
the discharge was "sudden or accidental." HSC argued that the discharge
was in fact "sudden and accidental"
and that the exclusion should not apply.
The district court found that the discharge was deliberate, that the exclusion clause was not ambiguous, and
held that the policies did not provide
coverage.
Simultaneously, Downtown Airpark
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filed a diversity action seeking a de- meant "unexpected or unintended."

claratory judgment against two CGL inThe Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
surers stating that the insurers were withheld its decision on these appeals
required to defend and indemnify Down- pending an interlocutory decision of the
town Airpark in its settlement with HSC. Oklahoma Supreme Court on whether a
The insurers again moved for summary pollution exclusion clause in a CGL apjudgment based upon the clause in the plies to long-term hazardous waste disCGL policies which excluded coverage posal. The Oklahoma state courts had
for personal injury or property damage split on this issue. The Oklahoma Sucaused by a pollution discharge. As preme Court held that the terms
before, the exclusion would not be effec- "sudden" and "accidental" were unamtive if the discharge was "sudden or ac- biguous in pollution exclusion clauses.
cidental." Downtown Airpark argued That court noted that the ordinary and
that the discharge was "sudden and ac- popular meaning of sudden involved an
cidental" and that the exclusion should element of time which did not define a
not apply. The district court found that gradual routine disposal of waste.
the discharge occurred pursuant to rouThe court of appeals, in light of the
tine business practice, that the exclusion recently handed down supreme court
clause was not ambiguous, and held decision, determined that "sudden" and
that the policies did not provide "accidental" did not apply to the waste
coverage.
disposal at the Hardage site and that
In examining the issue of insurance the exception to the pollution exclusion
coverage, the lower court in the instant clause in the CGLs was not applicable.
decision based its application of the Accordingly, the court affirmed the disterm "sudden and accidental" on the trict court's entry of summary judgment
facts found in the CERCLA action. The for the insurance companies.
district court in the CERCLA action had
The court of appeals also decided a
found that the Hardage Waste Disposal jurisdictional issue related to the appeal
Site caused environmental contamina- of the state garnishment petition. The
tion. Among the activities that caused court noted the division among the cirthe contamination were intentional spray- cuits as to whether the district court's aning of hazardous substances out of the cillary or supplemental jurisdiction
main pit to reduce its volume, removal of extended to state causes of action
main pit substances to be mixed with brought against non-parties to the CERsludge and deposited outside of the CIA action. The court of appeals determain pit, deliberate breaching of the mined that because this particular
main pit to cause substance flow out to CERCLA action was brought prior to the
other site areas, and drumming of waste 1990 enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367,
outside of the main pit which subse- which was designed to supplant the traquently caused damage due to rupture. ditional concepts of ancillary and penAll of these activities occurred over a dent jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit's case
number of years.
law on ancillary jurisdiction applied.
Both HSC and Downtown Airpark The court decided that when a garnishappealed the entry of summary judgment ment proceeding was instigated on an
in favor of the insurers, arguing that the alleged indemnity agreement between a
district court erroneously interpreted the judgment debtor and insurer, ancillary
meaning of "sudden and accidental" jurisdiction should not be assumed and
under Oklahoma law. While the district an independent basis may be required.
court found it to mean "abrupt or quick However, the court concluded that in this
and unexpected or unintended," HSC particular case, the issues in both actions
and Downtown Airpark argued it merely were not significantly different and that

the district
jurisdiction.

court

had

ancillary

-Michael B. Hunter

Hanford Downwinders Coolition, Inc.
v. Dowdle, 71 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir.
1995)
Plaintiffs (the Coalition) in this case
were citizens groups and individuals
seeking injunctive relief requiring the
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) to institute a health
surveillance program for the population
surrounding the Hanford Nuclear Reservation (Hanford) in Richland, Washington. The Coalition sued defendant
Dawdle in his capacity as Administrator
of the ATSDR.
Hanford was part of the Manhattan
Project, producing plutonium beginning
in 1943, and continuing production for
approximately thirty years. As a result of
this plutonium production, radioactive
iodine and other hazardous materials
entered into the atmosphere, soil, and
water, exposing humans to radiation
and other hazardous materials.
When the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) proposed placing Hanford
on the National Priorities List in 1988, it
drafted a comprehensive cleanup plan
for the site. In this plan was a summary
of the specific responsibilities of ATSDR.
Among these duties was the task of conducting a health assessment study to determine the current or future impact on
health caused by the release of hazardous substances, developing recommendations, and identifying actions needed
to evaluate and mitigate adverse health
effects. In 1989, ATSDR completed its
preliminary draft of the health assessment
report. Because information available at
the time was insufficient, ATSDR planned
to continue to follow the results of relevant studies, and re-evaluate when appropriate. At that time, ATSDR did not
begin a health surveillance program.
In 1993, the Coalition filed suit in
the United States District Court for the
MEP
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Eastern District of Washington and
sought injunctive relief against ATSDR.
The Coalition alleged that ATSDR had a
mandatory duty under Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCIA) to begin a
health surveillance program.
ATSDR filed a motion to dismiss
based on CERCLA's Timing of Review
provision. The relevant portion of the
statute stated that "[n]o Federal court
shall have jurisdiction" over "any challenges to removal or remedial action"
other than in situations listed in the exceptions. The district court granted the
motion to dismiss, finding that ATSDR's
ongoing "health related actions" constituted removal or remedial activities as
defined by CERCLA provisions. Because
the Coalition's claim challenged discretionary ATSDR actions that qualified as a
removal, the district court determined it
did not have jurisdiction to hear the
claim.
The Coalition appealed on several
grounds. First, it argued that the "health
assessment" and surveillance activities of
ATSDR were not "removal or remedial"
actions. Second, even if the court did
determine that the ATSDR activities were
removal or remedial actions, not all the
requirements of the Timing of Review Provision were met, and the bar to jurisdiction did not apply.
The two
requirements allegedly not met were: 1)
that the Coalition was not "challenging"
ATSDR's activities, but merely seeking an
injunctive order; and 2) that since the
initiation of a health surveillance program was required by CERCIA, and the
CERCIA Timing of Review Provision only
applied to discretionary action, the jurisdictional bar did not come into play.
Third, the Coalition argued that if the
court did find that the Timing of Review
Provision applied, the Coalition should
have been allowed to sue under the citizens suit exception of the same statute.
Finally, the Coalition claimed that application of the timing provision requirements denied plaintiff due process.
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit found that the CERCIA Timing of
Review provision did apply, because the
activities of ATSDR met the definitions of
"removal" or "remedial" activities. The
court determined that ATSDR's responsibility was to effectuate and implement
CERCIA's health related . authorities,
which included a requirement that
ATSDR complete a health assessment of
a proposed EPA site. Only if ATSDR determined there was a significant increase
in risk of health problems due to the exposure to hazardous substances must
ATSDR then initiate a health surveillance
program. Hence, the health surveillance
program was within ATSDR's discretion.
The court of appeals found support
for its conclusion in the title of the statutory section. The court pointed out that
the relevant statutory section was entitled
"Response Authorities." Thus, the court
interpreted congressional intent to include the ATSDR health related authorities .within the category of response
authorities.
The instant court also held that
ATSDR health assessment and surveillance authorities satisfied the statute's
definition of "removal action" because it
found one of CERCIA's core functions
was to identify and ameliorate the effects
of the release of hazardous materials on
the population. Since ATSDR was the
mechanism to accomplish this function of
CERCIA, its health assessment and surveillance activities were eligible for CERCLA Timing of Review jurisdictional
protection.
The court also dismissed the Coalition's assertion that the group was not
"challenging" ATSDR's activities. The
court noted that case law defined
"challenge" as an action which was related to the goals of a cleanup effort.
The court of appeals found the Coalition's legal proceedings to meet this definition. As a result, ATSDR's activities fell
under statutory protection.
Further, the court of appeals dismissed the Coalition's argument that a

health surveillance program was required at Hanford. The coalition argued
that because the surveillance program
was required, ATSDR's actions were unprotected by the statute. The court found
that medical monitoring was necessary
only if the ATSDR first determined that
there was a significant health risk to an
affected population. Since ATSDR had
not made this determination, a health
surveillance program was within ATSDR
discretion.
- The court also struck down the Coalition's argument that the ATSDR had
"taken" action because it had conducted a health assessment and therefore could be challenged under the
citizen suit exception. The court of appeals determined that the health assessment could not be separated from the
"whole of the removal action." Hence,
the ATSDR had not yet "taken" action to
qualify the Coalition's suit under the citizen exception.
The court of appeals also disposed
of the Coalition's last argument, that it
was deprived of due process. The court
stated that it was within the discretion of
Congress to amend the statute if it
wanted to allow jurisdiction of suits such
as this. Since Congress had chosen to
bar jurisdiction, the court could not overlook the jurisdictional provisions of the
statute.
The court's final analysis was that
ATSDR's health assessment was a removal or remedial action, and as such,
any claim against the ATSDR for this action was barred by the jurisdictional ban
of CERCIA's Timing of Review provision.
- by Cynthia Giliner

RCRA
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 1996
WL 117012 (U.S.Jan. 10, 1996)
The Meghrigs, previous owners of
property contaminated by petroleum,
successfully defended a suit brought by
respondents KFC Western (KFC) under
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the Resource Recovery Conservation Act
(RCRA). KFC bought the property in Los
Angeles County, California, and proceeded to build a fast-food restaurant.
During construction, KFC discovered that
the soil was tainted with oil and subsequently spent $211,000 to clean it.
Three years later, KFC attempted to recover its costs from the Meghrigs by
bringing suit under RCRA. RCRA enables private property owners to sue former owners who have contributed to soil
contamination that presents an "imminent
and substantial endangerment to health
or the environment."
In its first amended complaint, KFC
argued that the Meghrigs should pay
restitution for the cleanup because, as
past owners of the property, they had
contributed to the handling and storage
of solid waste that at one time posed a
danger of imminent and substantial harm
to health and the environment. The district court dismissed KFC's complaint.
In a two-part decision, the court found
that § 6972(a) of RCRA did not permit
parties to recover for past cleanup efforts
and that § 6 9 72(a)(1)(B) authorized a
cause of action only when the contaminated property posed an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or
the environment when the suit was filed.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that RCRA gave district
courts the power to order restitution for
past cleanup costs. The court of appeals also found that a private property
owner was entitled to bring suit under §
6972(a)(1)(B) as long as the contamination had created imminent and substantial endangerment at the time the
cleanup occurred.
The Ninth Circuit's decision was in
conflict with the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals holding in Furrer v. Brown, 62
F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 1995), an analogous RCRA suit involving property contaminated by underground gasoline
storage tanks. The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the conflict
and to address the Ninth Circuit's broad

interpretation of the imminent endangerment requirement.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice O'Connor held that RCRA's citizen
suit provision was not directed at providing remedies for past cleanup efforts.
O'Connor applied a plain reading of
the remedial scheme under §
6972(a)(1)(B), finding that a private
party was limited to seeking either a
mandatory injunction against a former
property owner that required the defendant to cleanup the toxic waste or a prohibitory injunction that restrained the
defendant from causing further contamination.
The Court further held that neither of
those remedies provided for monetary
damages or restitution in cases involving
past cleanup costs. In support of the
decision, O'Connor distinguished the
citizen suit provisions of RCRA from that
of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA). O'Connor noted that CERCIA, which passed several years after
RCRA was already in effect, gave the
government the power to recover "all
costs of removal or remedial action,"
and that any person may seek contribution from any other person who is responsible for the contamination. The
language in RCRA did not provide for
such a remedy. In addition, O'Connor
stated that, unlike CERCIA, RCRA authorized a cause of action only when solid
or hazardous waste posed on imminent
and substantial danger to health or the
environment. The Court concluded that
Congress designed § 6972 of RCRA to
address only imminent harm, not remedies for past cleanup costs. As a result,
the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, upholding the district court's decision to
dismiss KFC's complaint as defective.

CLEAN AIR ACT

Virginia v. United States, No.
95-2229, 1996 WL 42115 (4th Cir.
Feb. 2, 1996)
The plaintiff, the Stale of Virginia,
filed claims in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
asserting that certain provisions of the
Clean Air Act (CAA) violated the Spending and Guarantee Clauses of the U.S.
Constitution and the Tenth Amendment.
The district court dismissed the action for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
court held that the CAA allowed challenges to final agency action only by
petition to the Court of Appeals. Virginia appealed the decision. The
United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal.
The CAA authorized the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator to create national ambient air
quality standards (NAAQS). Under the
CAA, an area which did not meet
NAAQS was to be designated as a
"nonattainment area." Title I of the CAA
provides that if a state has a nonattainment area, then it must create a state
implementation plan (SIP) to reduce volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions
by fifteen percent. The SIP should include a vehicle inspection and maintenance program. Title I provides for three
types of sanctions: 1) preventing state
spending of federal highway money in
nonattainment areas, 2) harsher permit
requirements for private industry, and 3)
initiation of a federal implementation
program. Title V of the CAA provides
that a state program must allow a full
opportunity for judicial review of permitting decisions. The sanctions available
for non-compliance with Title V are as
follows: 1) restricting state spending of
- by Douglas T. Cohen
federal highway money and 2) initiating
a federal implementation program.
Virginia's cause of action arose from
two disputes between the state and the
EPA. First, the EPA found that the state
MELPR
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failed to develop a vehicle inspection
and maintenance program and a VOC
reduction plan. Second, the state allegedly failed to generate an acceptable
stationary pollution source operating permit program. Specifically, the proposed
Virginia program restricted judicial review to those persons who proved a
"pecuniary and substantial" interest in
the outcome of the litigation.
Counts I and IIof Virginia s cause of
action stated that the CAA requirements
for a VOC reduction plan, the vehicle
inspection and maintenance programs,
and Title V violated the Tenth Amendment and Article IV's Guarantee Clause.
Count Ill asserted that the sanction of
loss of highway funds is not rationally
related to the objective of federal highway funding and thus violated Congressional authority under the Spending
Clause in Article I.
The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
It cited to CAA § 307(b)(1), which
stated, "[a] petition for review of [any] .
. . final action of the [EPA] Administrator
under this chapter . . . which is locally or

regionally applicable may be filed only
in the United States Court of Appeals for
the appropriate circuit." The issue before the appellate court was whether Virginia, by challenging the constitutionality
of the CAA, could receive direct review
by the district court.
On appeal, Virginia first argued that
it did not seek review of a final EPA action. However, the court of appeals
held that the objective of the state's petition was to nullify final .actions of the
EPA. The plaintiff sought a declaration
that the relevant provisions of the CAA
were unconstitutional and requested a
preliminary and permanent injunction
preventing EPA from enforcing the sanction provisions. Thus, the court concluded that Virginia was clearly
challenging a final EPA action.
Secondly, the state maintained that
constitutional challenges are not limited
to review only by circuit courts. Virginia
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suggested that the exclusive jurisdiction
of circuit courts was undermined by the
CAA s citizen suit provision. The citizen
suit provision provided the district court
with jurisdiction over claims that the EPA
Administrator had failed to perform a
nondiscretionary act or duty. However,
the instant court observed that Virginia's
claim had been rejected by previous
courts.
Next, the Virginia suggested
that a second component of the citizen
suit provision was evidence that Congress intended concurrent jurisdiction.
The provision provided "[niothing in this
section shall restrict any right which any
person . . . may have under any statute

or common law to seek enforcement ...
or to seek any other relief." However,
the court of appeals stated that this language simply meant that the statute did
not preempt any other available
remedies.
Also, Virginia argued that the court
of appeals should disregard the plain
language of § 307(b)(1), because its
constitutional claims could not receive
meaningful judicial review without factual development. The court concluded
that none of the state's claims required a
factual assessment, but the court did indicate that if the claims require such a factual assessment, the circuit court was
authorized to remand the case to the
agency for any necessary factual development. Furthermore, Virginia argued
that it should not be required to elicit
EPA final action in order to test its constitutional claims. The court stated that this
suit was not filed until after EPA final action; therefore, the court would not consider whether review under district court
general federal question jurisdiction may
have been obtained in the absence of
final EPA action.
Finally, Virginia
claimed that the policy reasons supporting direct review did not apply to constitutional challenges. The court explained
that the intention of Congress in' requiring such a review system, was. to promote prompt and conclusive review in all
air quality controversies.

Consequently, the court of appeals
affirmed the district court's dismissal of
Virginia's complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
-by Constance S. Chandler

CLEAN WATER ACT
New Mexico Citizens For Clean Air
and Water v. Espanola Mercantile
Company, Inc., 72 F.3d 830 (10th
Cir. 1996)
Plaintiffs, the New Mexico Citizens
for Clean Air and Water (Citizens), an
environmental group, along with the
Pueblo of San Juan (Pueblo), an Indian
tribe that owned the affected land,
brought suit
against defendant,
Espanola Mercantile Company, Inc.
(Espanola) for violations of the Clean
Water Act (CWA) in conjunction with
the company's operation of the Transit
Mix Facility in Espanola, New Mexico.
The parties agreed to binding arbitration
and each side prevailed on two of the
four issues. Following arbitration, the
parties entered into a consent decree
that required Espanola to implement and
finance a clean-up plan, obtain a permit
for future discharge, and pay Citizens'
and Pueblo's attorney fees as awarded
by the court. The District Court for the
District of New Mexico, in accordance
with Citizens' and Pueblo's requests,
awarded $46,003.69 in attorney fees.

Espanola appealed on the grounds that

Pueblo was not entitled to attorney fees,
and the amount of the fees awarded
was incorrectly determined.
On appeal to the Uhited States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Distric,
Esponola contended that Pueblo was not
entitled' to attorney fees because Pueblo
failed to comply with a provision of the
CWA requinng a party to give sixtyday
notice of the alleged violation prior to
commencing an action. Pueblb admitted it did not comply, but argued that
Citizens' compliance was sufficient to
relieve Pueblo from the notice
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requirement. The court of appeals cited
to case low construing a similar notice
provision found in the Resource Conservotion and Recovery Act, which held
separate notice to be a mandatory requirement for filing suit that could not be
disregarded by district courts. The instant court, in accordance with other federal courts, applied the same
interpretation to the CWA, finding that
Pueblo was not a proper party to the
action and was, therefore, not entitled to
an award of attorney fees.
Espanola challenged the amount of
the award for attorney fees on several
grounds. First, it argued that the limited
degree of the two plaintiffs' success
should be considered in the determination. Espanola relied on a case that required the district court to make a
qualitative assessment to determine if
plaintiff's limited success justifies a reduction in the amount of attorney fees. Citizens argued that the case Espanola
cited was not on point, because the
agreement between the parties required
Espanola to pay all reasonable attorney
fees. Citizens cited no authority for its
contention and the court of appeals
agreed with Espanola. The court, therefore, remanded the issue to determine to
what extent the award should. be
reduced.
Espanola also sought to reduce the
award for attorney fees where the tasks
could have been delegated to a nonprofessional. These tasks included investigation of the factual basis for the claim
and various secretarial duties performed
by counsel. The court of appeals
agreed with Espanola and remanded
the case for a determination of whether
the tasks in question were of the type
that should have been delegated to a
nonprofessional. Espanola asked for a
further reduction on the basis of duplication of effort. It argued that attendance
by two attorneys was not necessary at
various meetings.
Again the court
agreed and remanded the issue for consideration by the district court. Finally,

the court also ordered reduction in the
award for time spent by counsel on
press related activities.
- by Tom Collins
Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co. Inc., 73 F.3d 546
(5th Cir. 1996)
The Sierra Club filed an action
under the citizen suit provision of the
Clean Water Act (CWA) against Cedar
Point Oil Company (Cedar Point), alleging a violation due to the disposal of
chemically contaminated water into the
Galveston Bay without a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit. Cedar Point counterclaimed that Sierra Club "threatened" it
with a citizen suit and conspired with the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
despoil it of its constitutional rights.
In 1991, Cedar Point relocated
twentyfour oil wells, which had been
purchased from Chevron Corporation in
1989, to a field near Galveston Bay.
One well, in addition to producing oil
and gas, discharged between 500 to
1200 barrels of "produced" water per
day. Produced water is a mixture of
source water, which is water extracted
from the ground with oil and gas, and
chemicals used in the drilling process.
Cedar Point discarded its produced water through a four-step process, ultimately
resulting in the disposal of the remaining
produced water into Galveston Bay. Although Cedar Point had succeeded in
interest to Chevron's produced water
permit, Cedar Point subsequently learned
that an additional NPDES discharge permit would be necessary. In October
1992, Cedar Point applied to the EPA
for the necessary NPDES permit, following a twelve-month period of produced
water discharge without a permit.
The Sierra Club's suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas sought: 1)a finding
that Cedar Point had violated the CWA,
2) a permanent injunction against further

unpermitted discharges, and 3) monetary penalties for previous unauthorized
discharges. Cedar Point, in its counterclaim for abuse of process, asked for
compensatory damages for the emotional distress of its officers and directors
and $10,000,000 in punitive damages. The district court granted summary judgment to Sierra Club, given that
its claim was not frivolous. The court,
however, denied Cedar Point's partial
summary judgment motion on -the issues
of liability, Sierra Club's standing to sue,
and Sierra Club's capacity to state a
claim under the CWA. Inaddition, the
district court granted Sierra Club's motion to strike Cedar Point's named experts, concluding that Cedar Point
unsuccessfully complied with a discovery
order to produce experts' written reports,
and statements and reasons for experts'
opinions. Both Cedar Point and Sierra
Club appealed.
Cedar Point's first argument on
appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was that Sierra Club lacked standing to bring a citizen suit because its
members failed to show an "injury in
fact," or that the alleged injury was
"fairly traceable" to Cedar Point's discharge. The court, however, concluded
that both standing requirements were
met. The affidavits produced by the Sierra Club that indicated both past and
future "threatened injury" to Sierra Club
members was sufficient to establish an
"injury in fact." Moreover, because the
Sierra Club successfully demonstrated
that Cedar Point 1) had discharged
some pollutant in concentrations greater
than allowed by its permit, 2)into a waterway in which Sierra Club had an interest that was or could be adversely
affected by the pollutant, and 3)that the
pollutant caused or contributed to the
kinds of injuries alleged by the Sierra
Club, it met the "fairly traceable" test.
Although Cedar Point argued that Sierra
Club was required to show that Cedar
Point's discharge actually injured a Sierra Club member, the court found it
MELPR
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sufficient that the Sierra Club proved the
water
produced
of
discharge
"contributed" to the environmental hazards which lead to Sierra Club's
claimed injuries.
Cedar Point* next argued that
because Sierra Club failed to allege that
Cedar Point was violating an effluent
limitation or permit provision, it had
failed to state a claim under the CWA.
The court of appeals disagreed. The
CWA's plain language clearly indicated
that a citizen may bring suit under the
Act against any person discharging produced water without a permit. Nothing
limited this right to situations in which the
EPA had issued an effluent limitation or a
permit that covered the discharge.
Therefore, the Sierra Club stated a valid
claim under the CWA.
Cedar Point's third argument
was that it had not violated the CWA,
which regulated the release of
"pollutants," because the CWA did not
explicitly define either produced water or
its components as pollutants. Moreover,
Cedar Point argued that the EPA, not the
courts, had the power to expand the
definition of pollutant beyond the explicit
definition given in the statute in order to
avoid the confusion of numerous definitions reached by various courts. The instant court employed a two-step analysis
to reach its conclusion. First, it determined that logic dictated the necessity
for courts to determine whether a substance is a pollutant in order to find that
a defendant had violated the statute.
Cedar Point's failure to indicate contrary
statutory or judicial authority supported
this finding. Second, the court stated
that produced water constituted a
"pollutant" under the CWA for a variety
of reasons: statutes included the term
produced water in substances including
"chemical wastes" and ."industrial
wastes"; the existence of a very narrow
exception to the definition of produced
water indicated congressional concern
over the effects of the substance; EPA
explicitly referred to produced water as

172

AWELPRI

a pollutant; and EPA regulations deeming several components of produced water as "toxic pollutants." The court of
appeals, therefore, concluded that Cedar Point had indeed violated the CWA.
Cedar Point's fourth argument
claimed the district court abused its discretion by striking expert testimony as a
sanction for Cedar Point's failure to comply with an accelerated discovery order.
The court of appeals concluded that Cedar Point had violated the discovery order, and the striking of experts was
appropriate. Cedar Point also argued
that a penalty of $186,070 and the
granting of attorneys' fees was inappropriate for violating the CWA. The court
affirmed the penalty, stating the district
court had not abused its discretion by
awarding damages equal to the savings
realized by Cedar Point due to the violation. Moreover, it allowed attorneys'
fees, given its conclusion that Sierra
Club had standing to sue and Cedar
Point had violated the CWA. Finally,
the court of appeals affirmed the district
court's dismissal of Cedar Point's counterclaim against Sierra Club for abuse of
process.
Sierra Club also appealed, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction and abused its discretion by
amending its final judgment to allow Cedar Point to utilize a two-year "grace
period" for compliance with the "no discharge" requirement. The court held that
the district court had jurisdiction to
amend its original order and did not
abuse its discretion by doing so.
- by Lynette McCloud

SMCRA
National Mining Association v. United
States Department of the Interior, 70
F.3d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
Through appropriate administrative procedures, the National Mining
Association and the Interstate Mining
Compact Commission (Miners) had

petitioned for the repeal of a Department
of the Interior (Department) regulation
promulgated pursuant to the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act
(SMCRA). The regulation allowed the
Department to give certain notices of vialation (NOV) to operators of mining operations in states considered to be
"primacy" states. The Department generally permitted primacy states to be the
primary enforcement body within their
own borders, provided that the states
operated under a state program of enforcement approved by the Department.
SMCRA allowed the Department to issue
NOVs to mine operators who were not
satisfying permit conditions or SMCRA
requirements, but only during certain
types of inspections.
The rule at issue in the present
case permitted the Department to issue
such an NOV based upon inspections
other than those enumerated in SMCRA,
including inspections founded on violations of SMCRA, the relevant state's program, or a permit condition when the
state did not take appropriate action
within ten days of being notified of the
violation by the Department. In 1983,
the Miners petitioned for the repeal of
this rule. The Department published the
petition and sought comments in its regard. The Department denied the petition and explained its rationale. The
Miners, the appellants in the present action, brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for
review of the agency's determination.
The district court granted summary judgment to the Department, and
the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed, holding: 1
that SMCRA expressly prevents judicial
review of the Department's NOV rule
because the Act itself bars review more
than sixty days after a challenged
agency action, 2)the Department's publication of the petition and a Department's statement denying the petition did
not qualify it for application of the
"reopener doctrine," and 3) the
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Department's refusal to repeal the NOV
rule was reasonable.
First, the court of appeals found
that the Miners had demonstrated
enough injury to establish standing. The
Miners' associations claimed standing
because they were "representative of
mine operators caught in the regulatory
crossfire between state and federal
authorities," and because the members
were "at best, subject to costly uncertainty as to which standards must be met
in their mining operations, and [were],
at worst, responsible for expensive efforts
to redo or undo actions taken at the behest of the state authority with which the
Department later disagrees."
Next, the court analyzed the
statutory bar applicable to actions taken
under SMCRA. Pursuant to the statute,
the court of appeals held that to the extent the Miners' claim in regard to the
NOV rule dealt with an issue in existence within sixty days of the Department's adoption of the rule, the district
court lacked jurisdiction. The court
based this finding on the statute's requirement that challenges to agency actions must be filed within sixty days from
the date of such action. The court felt
that because Congress set forth in the
statute a "careful balance between the
need for administrative finality and the
need to provide for subsequent review,"
permitting a review of the Miners' petition would "thwart Congress' well-laid
plan." Therefore, the court held that review was barred except and only to the
extent that it was sought on grounds arising after the sixtieth day.
The Miners then relied upon the
"reopener doctrine," under which the
time period for judicial review could begin to run again if an agency provided
a new opportunity for comment and objection through a new promulgation. In
this regard, the Miners looked to the
Department's procedural handling of the
subject matter as a basis for application
of the doctrine. The court of appeals
did not permit this theory to proceed,

holding that most rulemaking will impact
several other rules that are not explicitly
at issue in the rulemaking at hand; as a
result, allowing any such affected rule to
be reopened for judicial review would
be contrary to the concept of "final
agency action" and would discourage
administrative agencies to act positively
in regard to rulemaking petitions in general. Similarly, the court held that administrotive denial of the Miners' petition did
not demonstrate agency reconsideration
of the issue that was sufficient for application of the "reopener doctrine."
For those aspects of the case
which did satisfy jurisdictional requirements, the instant court held that the Department acted reasonably when it
denied the Miners' petition for rulemaking. Indoing so, the court noted that the
scope of review of an agency determination denying a petition for rulemaking is
extremely limited, to the point of almost
"non-reviewabilty." Therefore, given the
limited scope of judicial review in these
matters, the court found in favor of the
Department.
- by Bryan D. Watson

CONSTITUTIONAL
CLAIMS
Brown v. United States, 73 F.3d
I 100, (D.C. Cir. 1996)
Plaintiffs, David and Carolyn
Brown (the Browns), appealed a verdict
for defendant, the United States, that rejected their Fifth Amendment claim for
compensation for a taking of property.
The U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal District, reversed and remanded the case,
holding that there was a genuine issue
of material fact.
The Browns' complaint alleged
that noise from flights by the U.S. Air
Force constituted a taking and required
compensation of $1.5 million. The
Browns moved for a partial summary
judgment, claiming that undisputed evidence proved the overflights constituted

I

a taking, with the only issue remaining
being the value of the taken property.
After a hearing, the trial court granted
the United States' motion for summary
judgment, and denied the Browns' partial summary judgment motion.
The court of appeals stated in its
findings of fact that the Air Force started
using Wizard Auxiliary Airfield, an airstrip located near the Browns' farm, for
pilot training in 1991. These exercises
required planes to fly low and thus produced a great deal of ground noise.
The government purchased the land it
built Wizard on in fee title. It also purchased an easement over land surrounding the airfield that abutted the Browns'
property.
The Browns, however, refused
to sell the Air Force an easement, and
the Air Force did not initiate a condemnation on the property to secure the
easement. Nevertheless, planes flew
500 feet or less above ground level over
100 acres or more of the Browns' property. The Browns' used their 6,858 acre
ranch for hunting and raising cattle, and
they kept two homes on the property.
They eventually intended to sell this land
on the recreational property market.
After the Browns filed a complaint in 1992 that alleged a taking and
sought damages, the trial court found
that the Browns had not shown substantial interference with their present enjoyment and use of the property. Rather,
the court found that they only showed an
adverse effect on market price, not an
interference in current use.
The court of appeals noted that
noise from airplane flights over private
lands must meet three requirements in
order to constitute a physical taking.
The noise must: 1) be directly over
claimant's land; 2)be low and frequent;
and 3) be a substantial interference with
enjoyment and use of the land. The goernment argued that the first two of these
factors exist as to the Browns' land, but
because evidence showed the cattle
were not upset by the noise and receipts
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from hunting remain the same, there was
no showing of substantial interference.
The Browns argued that economic harm
in the form of decreased market value of
their property created a genuine issue of
material fact. The Browns argued further
that since the flight exercises were a permanent activity, a taking existed.
The instant court's analysis began with a legal definition of "enjoy,"
which included the right to future use for
investment purposes. The court pointed
out that included in a landowner's bundle of rights was the right to sell land for
the best price. The court then hinted that
such impairment of property value due to
overflights may be interference with an
owner's enjoyment. Disagreeing with
the trial court, the court designated the
decline in market value as a present,
rather than anticipated, impact.
The court of appeals ruled that
affidavits concerning the marketability of
the Brown ranch were factors that
needed to be weighed by the trial court.
The court found that the trial court erred
in granting the government's summary
judgment motion and remanded the
case.
- by Wendy Hickey

Fort Grotiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v.
Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 71 F.3d 1197 (6th Cir. 1995)
In 1988, Michigan made two
amendments to its Solid Waste Management Plan. These amendments banned
the disposal of waste from any out-ofstate source, or from any other Michigan
county, unless the receiving county explicilly allowed for such disposal in its
solid waste management plan. Fort
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc., (Fort Gratiot) filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
in 1989, seeking an order declaring the
ban on disposal of out-of-state waste unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution. Italso sought
a permanent injunction against the ban's
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enforcement. Fort Gratiot did not attack
the amendments' regulation of waste
shipped from one Michigan county to
another.
The district court dismissed this complaint in 1990, and the court of appeals
affirmed in 1991. On June 1, 1992,
the United States Supreme Court reversed and held that the amendments
discriminated against interstate commerce and, therefore, violated the Commerce Clause. The court of appeals then
issued an order on August 7, 1992,
stating that the district court's decision
was reversed and Fort Gratiot was
granted costs pursuant to the Supreme
Court's ruling. According to Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure 40(a) and
41(a), appellate court orders become
mandates after twentyone days, and
jurisdiction should then return to the district court. However, the court of appeals in the instant case did not return
the record to the district court until June
8, 1993. It was not until this time that
the court of appeals fully conformed with
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
41(a), which directs appellate courts to
issue mandates, and Sixth Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 23.1, which
requires appellate courts to return the
record to the district court when they issues mandates.
Meanwhile, while Fort Gratiot's
case was being litigated, the Supreme
Court decided Dennis v. Higgins, 498
U.S. 439 (1991), holding that a party
may receive money damages for a Commerce Clause violation. On February
10, 1994, Fort Gratiot moved to amend
its complaint to include a section 1983
claim for damages, and moved for summary judgment on its complaint.
Fort Gratiot attributed its delay in
filing to confusion on the part of the district court concerning which judge would
take the case on remand, as the original
judge recused himself. Fort Gratiot
claimed that itcontacted the court clerk's
office twice to try to resolve the issue.
When the parties were finally notified

that the case had been set for a schedul
ing conference with a new judge, Fort
Gratiot filed its motions for leave to
amend. On April 22, 1994, the court
heard oral argument on both motions.
In an order dated May 2, 1994,
the district court denied both motions.
The court stated that the claim for domages should have been brought in Fort
Grotiot's original complaint, or alternatively, Fort Gratiot should have acted
more quickly to have the case reassigned. The district court next stated
that, although it had heard and denied
the motions to amend, the case had
been closed by the court of appeals'
order of August 7, 1992. It reasoned
that the November 8, 1993, order
merely reissued the court of appeals'
earlier mandate. Fort Gratiot then appealed from this decision.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, the court held that
because of judicial delay in returning the
original record to the district court, and
the resulting failure of the district court to
retry the case, there was never a viable
judgment on Fort Gratiot's original complaint. The court reasoned that customary procedure requires lower courts,
which obtain jurisdiction by receiving
mandates from appellate courts, to obey
such mandates and carry them into effect. The court of appeals then stated
that the lower courts must determine the
scope of the appellate mandate, considering majority and dissenting opinions
and issues not decided by the Supreme
Court.
The court of appeals determined that
an issue remained as to the scope of the
Supreme Court's holding. Fort Gratiot
argued that the Supreme Court's opinion
invalidated the amendments to the Michigan Solid Wasted Management Plan
completely. Michigan Department of
Natural Resources claimed that since
Fort Gratiot did not challenge the intrastate, intercounty waste regulations in its
original complaint, the Supreme Court's
decision
only
prohibited
the
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amendments' ban on interstate transfers
of waste. The court of appeals held
that it was the district court's duty to determine whether the Supreme Court's
opinion operated to completely invalidate the amendments, or just those porlions regulating interstate movement of
waste.
The court of appeals also determined that the district court had a duty to
reconsider its holding on Fort Gratiot's
motions to amend its complaint. The
court stated that the district court should
consider its lack of jurisdiction between
March 1990, when Fort Graiot appealed from the district court's dismissal,
and August 1992, when the court of
appeals issued its mandate. The court
of appeals suggested that the district
court should not punish Fort Gratiot for
what was, for the most part, the court's
delay.
- by Erick Roeder

OTHER
Stupok-Throll v. United States, 70 F.3d
881 (6th Cir. 1995)
Landowners with riparian rights
to a lake challenged United States Forest
Service (Forest Service) regulations that
restricted surface rights to the lake. The
regulations prohibited the use of sailboats, houseboats, and certain food
containers on the lake. The landowners
argued to the District Court for the Western District of Michigan that the restrictions exceeded the Forest Service's
statutory and constitutional authority, because the Wilderness Act of 1964 instructed that such restrictions were
"subject to existing private rights." The
landowners contended that their riparian
rights constituted "existing rights," meaning that the restriction should be invalidated. The district court held for the
Forest Service, finding that the Constitulional Property Clause granted Congress
the power to regulate the lake, that Congress delegated this authority to the

Forest Service in the Wilderness Act,
and that the Forest Service regulation did
not run afoul of the Act's express limitations deferring to state law property
rights.
Plaintiffs in the consolidated suit
were landowners Kathy Stupak-Thrall
and Michael and Bodil Gajewski (Landowners). Landowners all lived on a
small portion of property bordering
Crooked Lake in Michigan, which is locoted in the Upper Peninsula, near the
Wisconsin border. About 95% of the
lake is within the confines of Sylvania
Wilderness Area, and Landowners lived
on the only portion that was not included
in the wilderness area. Because they
lived adjacent to the lake, Landowners
had riparian rights that allowed them to
use the entire surface of the lake for their
use and enjoyment. The restrictions,
banning "sail-powered watercraft,"
"watercraft designed for or used as floating living quarters," and "non-burnable
disposable beverage containers," applied only to the wilderness area and
did not include the small bay on which
Landowners lived.
Infinding for the Forest Service,
the district court first had to decide
whether Congress had the authority to
regulate this land, and if such power
was properly delegable to the Forest
Service. The court observed that the
Property Clause of the Constitution allowed Congress to sometimes regulate
private property as well as public property. This power over public lands may
be extended to private property in order
to protect public areas. The court
pointed out that Congress designed the
regulations at issue to protect the federal
property's "wilderness character and
values." Since the court concluded that
the regulations would serve to meet this
protective end, Congress could regulate
the portion of the lake used for private
purposes.
Having decided that Congress
could limit the use of this private property, the lower court then held that the

power to regulate was properly delegated to the Forest Service. Landowners
argued that Congress had not promulgated any statute to give Forest Service
the power to make rules respecting government property. However, the court
decided in favor of the Forest Service for
several reasons: The Organic Act of
1897 allowed the Department of Agriculture to make rules respecting preservation of forests, the National Forest
Management Act of 1976 extended this
power to the Forest Service, and the Forest Service had properly made rules and
regulations in the past concerning the
use of vehicles in the wilderness area.
The district court quickly dismissed several other claims as misinterpretations of
text.
Lastly, the court addressed the
extent to which the clause "subject to
valid existing rights" allows state law to
affect the federal government's normal
exercise of power under the property
clause. The district court had noted that
Michigan law distinguished "natural purposes" and "artificial purposes." Natural purposes, it found, were uses that
were absolutely necessary for the riparion user, such as drinking water, while
artificial purposes were those that increased comfort and prosperity, such as
soiling and water skiing. Artificial purposes would be permissible as long as
they did not unreasonably interfere with
other users' similar rights. The district
court held that the Forest Service's restrictions were reasonable in light of the fact
that the United States was also a riparian user. Landowners appealed on
those issues.
The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that the Forest Service's
power to regulate riparian rights of the
lake came not from its status as common
riparian owner, but from legitimate exercise of the sovereign's police power.
Thus, the only remaining impediment to
validity of the regulations was that Congress had inserted into the Wilderness
Act the clause protecting "existing
MELPR
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rights."
The court held that the exercise
of police power was permissible, because it would have been exercisable by.
the police power of Michigan, even over
"existing rights." The Michigan Supreme Court had explicitly decided that
local government had the power to regulate riparian rights. Michigan required
a rational relationship between the exercise of that power and the state's goal
of protecting the health, safety and welfare, and the preservation of wilderness.
The court of appeals decided that the
regulations were rationally related.
The court also found the restrictions to be reasonable. The regulations
affected only "artificial" riparian uses
and did not apply to the section of the
lake that fell outside the wilderness
area's boundaries. Landowners did not
argue that houseboats and sailboats
where necessary for their life, a distinctive characteristic of the "natural purposes" requirement. The court observed
that there was no evidence that houseboats or sailboats had ever been used
on the lake by landowners or anyone
else. Thus, since the court of appeals
found that the exercise of police power
was rationally related to the goal of preserving wilderness and that the regulotions were reasonable, it held that the
lower court's rulings should be affirmed.
- by Kevin Murphy

State of Alaska v. Babbitt 72 F.3d
698 (9th Cir. 1995)
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reviewed the term
"public lands" as it was used in the
Alaska National Interest Land Conservation Act (ANILCA) to decide whether that
term included navigable waters. This
determination was necessary after a dispute arose over federal involvement in
protecting subsistence fishing under
ANILCA.
Congress enacted Title VIII of
ANILCA to protect subsistence hunting
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and fishing in Alaska. It gave the state
the initial authority to implement Title VIII,
but the federal government assumed that
authority in 1990, after state implementation failed. The Secretary of the Interior (the Secretary) then established
temporary regulations which narrowly
defined public lands by excluding navigable waters from the definition.
Two separate actions were
brought against the Secretary and
against the United States. Katie John,
an Ahtno Athabaskan Indian of the Mentasta Village who represented the subsistence interests, challenged the narrow
definition of navigable waters as defined
by the Secretary. In an attempt to expand the reach of ANILCA, Katie John
argued that all navigable waters were
public lands under the federal navigational servitude, which is a doctrine that
relates to the United States' interest in the
country's navigable waters. Conversely,
the second action was a state challenge
to the involvement of the federal government in what Alaska believed was a
state matter, wherein the state argued
that federal public lands should never
include navigable waters. The United
States District Court for the District of
Alaska consolidated these actions and
found for Katie John, upholding federal
interests in a very broad definition of
public land.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals first looked to ANILCA
to find a definition of public lands. It
determined public lands, for ANILCA
purposes only, to mean "lands, waters,
and interests therein, the title of which is
in the United States." Since the navigational servitude creates no title in the
United States, the court of appeals
stated that those waters were not necessarily public land under ANILCA. In
striking down Katie John's argument, the
court said that too much control would
be given to the federal government if all
navigable waters were deemed public
land.
The court next looked to the

reserved water rights doctrine and the
reservation of unappropriated waters.
Despite a lack of title, the court found
that the United States had an interest in
certain unappropriated waters according to the reserved water rights doctrine.
If reserving water was necessary to soisfy the reasons for the preservation of
the land, the court said, then the United
States would have an interest in the water as well.
The court of appeals concluded
by stating that a moderate approach in
which federal control over navigable
waters is not absolute, but is still available to protect the government's interest
in subsistence fishing, is most appropriate. The federal agencies that have had
the task of implementing Title VIII, the instant court also held, were responsible
for determining what waters meet this
criteria.
- by Marc Poston
Rhone-Poulenc Inc. v. International Insurance Company, 71 F.3d 1299 (7th
Cir. 1995)
Rhone-Poulenc Incorporated (RhonePoulenc) brought suit against its insurance company, International Insurance
Company (international), after RhonePoulenc sustained substantial clean-up
costs related to environmental contamination of several sites. Rhone-Poulenc
sought reimbursement under Environmental Impairment Liability (EIL) policies
issued by International. International rejected the claims on the basis that the Elt
policies were "excess" insurance policies
and Rhone-Poulenc had not shown exhaustion of its comprehensive general
liability insurance. After the refusal,
Rhone-Poulenc filed suit, and the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the case for
Rhone-Poulenc's failure to join its nineteen other comprehensive general liability insurers as indispensable parties.
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, the key issue was
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whether the Eli policies qualified as
"primary," rather than "excess" insurance policies. A primary insurance policy would have given Rhone-Poulenc the
right to collect from International regardless of its other insurance. On the other
hand, an excess insurance policy would
have given Rhone-Poulenc the right to
collect only after exhausting its other insurance. Ifthe EIL policies were primary,
then the district court's dismissal could
not be upheld because primary insurers
would not necessarily be indispensable
parties. The court of appeals noted that
parties are considered indispensable
only if equity requires their presence before litigation can proceed. Therefore, if
the Eli policies were primary, the case
needed to be remanded to determine
which, if any, of the primary insurers
were indispensable parties. If the policies were excess, then the court of appeals needed to uphold the lower court
opinion, because the court could not
properly determine the liability of an excess insurer, such as International, without the presence of the comprehensive
general liability insurers.
In determining if the Eli policies
were primary or excess, the court identified a specific provision that stated the
policy should "not be called upon in
contribution and no liability should attach hereunder" for amounts RhonePoulenc could recover from other insurance. International argued that this
wording alone should make the policies
ones that are excess. However, RhonePoulenc argued that the coverage was
primary, for a variety of reasons, including the fact that International's policies
were not labeled "excess," and International failed to inquire as to any other
insurance Rhone-Poulenc might have.
International countered that if the policies
were not excess by express language,
they were certainly excess "by coincidence," as the type of coverage the policy provided depended on whether the
insured had other existing insurance. If
Rhone-Poulenc's EIL policies were in fact

excess by coincidence, the judgment of
the district court would have to be upheld because Rhone-Poulenc had nineteen other insurers, thus making its
policies through International excess.
The court of appeals, because of
International's lack of supporting documentotion on the origin and meaning of
the policy, did not accept International's
explanations. The court concluded that
the disputed provisions made the policy
ambiguous. The court was, therefore,
unable to determine whether the policy
was primary or excess by coincidence.
The court remanded the lower court's
opinion for a determination of the meaning of the policy.
- by Tom Collins
Fishermen's Dock Cooperative, Inc. v.
Brown, No. 95-1002, 1996 WL
42120 (4th Cir. Feb. 6, 1996)
The Fishermen's Dock Cooperative
and other commercial fishers (the Coolilion) sued the Department of Commerce
(the Department) over the summer flounder quota the Department established for
1994. The Coalition contended that the
Department did not establish the quota
in accordance with 16 U.S.C. §
1851(a)(2), which required the estimate
to be calculated using the "best scientific
information available."
The Coalition argued that the best
scientific information available demanded nothing less than a quota
based on a geometric-mean estimate,
and that the Department's resulting
quota was therefore "capricious and arbitrary." The district court agreed that
only the geometric-mean estimate could
be used to comply with the statute's requirements and it set aside the 1994
quota, replacing it with a new quota
based on the geometric-mean estimate.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and reinstated the Department's previous quota.
The Department, through the MidAtlantic Fishery Management Council

(the Council), promulgated a yearly
quota for the commercial catch of summer flounder. The Department established the quota through a series of
steps, starting with the determination of
the "target fishing mortality rate." Information was gathered in the form of row
data on current, Atlantic-coast, fish populations estimating the size, age, structure
and other relevant characteristics. These
estimates were then given to the Summer
Flounder Monitoring Committee (the
Committee) to make recommendations
on the quota size based on the best scientific evidence. The Committee's recommendation for the quota size was
based on a statutory equation employing
this data.
In -1994, the Committee recommended a quota based on the figure
determined by one standard deviation
lower than the geometric mean, which
would produce a lower quota than used
previously. The Committee cited seveal
reasons for using a standard other than
the geometric mean alone, including the
fact that since the Department planned to
lower the target fishing mortality rate dramatically in 1996, itwas best to reduce
the quota slowly. The Council approved
of the Committee's recommendation,
and after notice in the Federal Register,
the quota become final.
The Coalition did not complain
about the model equation the Committee
used in the quota determination. It only
argued that the employment of the strict
geometric-mean estimate represented the
best scientific information, in contrast to
the standard the Council adopted.
Therefore, the Coalition argued that use
of the lower deviation was arbitrary and
capricious. The Department responded
that the estimate "was in no way arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise illegal
and that, even if it was, the district court
overreached its authority in imposing a
new quota rather than remanding to the
agency."
In explaining its decision to reverse
in favor of the Department, the court of
MVELPR
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appeals determined that, while a certain
level of arbitrariness existed in the
agency's discretion to use one standard
deviation below the geometric mean as
the quota estimate, the determination
"was conducted in good faith, pursued
with a proper understanding of the law,
based on the best scientific information
available, and adequately justified by
the agency."
- by Christopher Pickett
Virginia Properties, Inc. v. Home Insuronce Company, No. 94-8452, 1996
WL 30575 (11th Cir. Feb. 12, 1996)
This case was an appeal from a
grant of summary judgment from the
United States District Court for the Northem District of Georgia. Plaintiff, Virginia
Properties, Inc. (VPI), was a wood treatment facility appealing a verdict in favor
of the defendants, the Home Insurance
Company and other insurers, which
barred coverage for clean-up costs associated with VPI's chemical waste discharge. The Eleventh Circuit Court
affirmed the lower court's ruling.
VPI, under clean-up orders from the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
sought indemnification and legal defense from its seven insurance compaThe district court held for
nies.
defendants on the basis of a clause in
the comprehensive liability policies that
excluded damages arising out of pollution, unless the discharge was "sudden
and accidental." VPI claimed that although its discharge of hazardous
chemicals was intentional, the damages
that occurred as a result were not and
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hence qualified for the exception of
"sudden and accidental."
The court of appeals found that from
nearly all
1986,
to
1971
comprehensive general liability insurance
contracts were drafted by the same underwriter group, and all contracts included pollution exclusion clouses.
Congress then enacted the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), both imposing a strict liability scheme for pollution clean-up. CERCIA authorizes the
government to order a responsible party
to clean up pollution or reimburse the
government for its costs incurred during
the clean-up, which has imposed great
liability costs on polluters. These responsible parties have consequently appealed to- their insurers for coverage,
resulting in increased litigation as insurers resist indemnification.
The facts of this case involved VPI's
wood treatment facility which, for thirty
years, had created chemical run-off from
the treatment process that had accumulated in an unlined pit in the ground.
CERCLA and RCRA had designated the
chemicals VPI used as "hazardous substances." The groundwater, soil and a
nearby stream were contaminated.
After VPI filed a 1980 permit application with the EPA, subsequent investigations resulted in placement of the VPI
site on the National Priorities List in
1989. The EPA issued two consent orders, the first in 1987 for agreement to
develop clean-up methods for the site,
and the second in 1992 to contain and

repair the damage. In 1993 the EPA
formally demanded reimbursement from
VPI. VPI initiated its action in 1992 to
require its insurers to provide defense
funds for the consent order proceedings
and for indemnification of the clean-up.
The insurers contested on the grounds
that VPI did not give them timely notice,
that CERCLA response costs were not
"damages" under policy terms, and finally, that coverage was precluded under the policy's exclusionary language.
The standard pollution clause in
each policy denies coverage for property damage arising from the discharge
of toxic chemicals into or upon the land
or water, with the exception of discharge that is sudden or accidental.
The evidence proved, and VPI admitted,
that its discharge of chemicals was intentional. VPI argued that the qualifying
language of the exclusion meant the exclusion would not apply if 1) the discharge was unintentional, or 2) if the
damage was unintended. The court of
appeals ruled against the second point
of VPI's contention.
It noted that the Georgia Supreme
Court has held "sudden and accidental"
means unexpected and unintended and
refers to the discharge, rather than the
damage. Thus, coverage is excluded if
the damage is the result of intentional
pollution. Ruling that the plain language
of the insurance contracts was unambiguous, the court held that VPI could not
recover costs of defense or indemnification from its insurers.

- by Wendy Hickey

